American
media "only partial returns show 726 articles, broadcasts, editorials,
and similar items as a direct result of agency activity," and that the
"multiplier effect" of such items must have been "substantial and significant."46"Special
intelligence and 'inside' briefings were given to U.S. journalists,"
the report continued, "in deference to the international influence of
the U.S. media." According to the CIA, the chief correspondent for a
cover article on the Allende election for Time, initially took
"Allende's protestations of moderation and constitutionality at face
value," but "CIA briefings in Washington changed the basic thrust of
the story."47 Indeed, the October 19,
1970, edition of Time, whose cover featured a leftward looking
Allende under the banner "Marxist Threat in the Americas," presented
a very pessimistic picture of Chile's future under Allende and relied
heavily on U.S. government information sources. For example, the article
stated that "two months ago the National Security Council received a
report that if Allende won a Communist takeover would inevitably follow,"
and "Washington intelligence sources believe that [Allende] can gain
effective control of the military within six months."48
The most often cited example of such "inside briefings" was given by
then National Security Council chief, Henry Kissinger, on September
16, 1970, in Chicago. Kissinger stated:
have yet to meet somebody who firmly believes that if Allende
wins, there is likely to be another free election in Chile... Now
it is fairly easy for one to predict that if Allende wins, there is
a good chance that he will establish over a period of years some sort
of communist government. In that case, we would have one not on an
island off the coast (Cuba) which has not a traditional relationship
and impact on Latin America, but in a major Latin American country
you would have a communist government, joining, for example,
Argentine... Peru... and Bolivia... So I don't think we should delude ourselves
that an Allende takeover in Chile would not present massive problems
for us, and for democratic forces and for pro-U.S. forces in Latin
America, and indeed to the whole Western Hemisphere.49