William Cummings, "New York Times Reactions to the
Election of Salvador Allende"


statement from the International Press Organization."55 The CIA lamented the lack of opposition to Allende in the Chilean press, and "had to rely increasingly on its own resources" in order to keep the "voice of public opposition alive inside Chile for coup purposes."56 Whether or not the CIA's accusations were true, the critical point is its ability to produce desired articles within the New York Times, and other papers around the world, solely through the evidence it supplied.

According to Tad Szulc, the September 25 editorial by C.L. Sulzberger referred to earlier was another example of a piece influenced by inside Washington sources. Szulc, based on sources within the State Department, claims that Kissinger had known about the possibility of a Soviet submarine base at Cienfuegos, Cuba, as early as July 1970. Kissinger chose to release the story to Sulzberger in September "for the benefit of American public opinion, to relate the dangers inherent in Communist Cuba to the dangers in Chile if Allende were confirmed as president."57

Whether or not we accept Szulc's interpretation of the events, it is clear that Sulzberger received information from government sources in Washington and duly repeated what he was told, and did so in an alarmist manner, dripping with anticommunist paranoia. At a time when the U.S. Government was intentionally trying to manipulate press coverage of an event, and in a region in which that government had a long history of both overt and covert intervention, Sulzberger and his peers dutifully, unhesitatingly, and unquestioningly repeated that which their government fed them as fact. Such examples certainly support Herman and Chomsky's claim that "the magnitude

55. CIA, "Report on Chilean CIA Task Force Activities, 15 September to 3 November 1970," 6-7.
56. Ibid., 7.
57. Ibid., 9.
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