Davis' second point of articulation addresses this issue. Because the
late nineteenth century was characterized by the integration of huge
new supplies of subsistence food into the world economy, the value of
the crops raised by any particular farmer-especially those without the
price protections of characteristic of farming in the developed world-dropped
dramatically in value. Therefore, because their cash crops were dropping
in value on the world market, farmers in the third world found themselves
no longer in control of their own financial standing and were often
forced into debt just to buy enough food to survive.6
Third, the imperial and economic power brought to bear against indigenous
governments in the third world prevented them from effectively providing
for their populations during famines. Essentially, as western states
controlled the debts of third world governments, local powers became
increasingly unable to fund critical infrastructure construction and
maintenance that would decrease vulnerability to climate shocks, like
those produced by ENSO. In India, for example, "public works in
post-Mutiny India were driven first by the exigencies of military control
and, second, by the demands of export agriculture"7
while long term sustainability, and, more importantly, the food security
of local farmers was a distant third, if it was addressed at all.8
Having outlined these three critical ways in which indigenous people
were made more vulnerable to ENSO, Davis argues that their food exports
cushioned food shocks in the western world, while they themselves acted
as captive markets for industrial goods. India, writes Davis, "was
forced to absorb Britain's surplus of increasingly obsolescent and noncompetitive
industrial exports"9 while at the same time its grain
exports allowed "London grain merchants to speculate during shortages
on the Continent."10 Britain's continued hold over a
share of western industrial dominance was funded by exploitation and
pauperization in the emerging third world.